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The concept of geneticization belongs to a style of thinking within the social sciences that refers to wide-
ranging processes and consequences of genetic knowledge. Lippman’s original use of the term was
political, anticipating the onerous consequences of genetic reductionism and determinism, while more
recent engagements emphasise the productivity and heterogeneity of genetic concepts, practices and
technologies. This paper reconstructs the geneticization concept, tracing it back to early political cri-
tiques of medicine. The argument is made that geneticization belongs to a style of constructionist
thinking that obscures and exaggerates the essentializing effects of genetic knowledge. Following
Hacking’s advice, we need a more literal sense of construction in terms of ‘assembly’ to give a clearer
account of the relationship between processes and products. Using the ‘assemblage’ concept to explore
the social ontology of genetics, the paper reviews three areas of the empirical literature on geneticization
e disease classiﬁcation, clinical practice and biosociality e to show that a new style of thinking has
appeared within the social sciences. In the ﬁnal assessment, the conditions that gave rise to genetici-
zation are now obsolete. While it may serve as a useful ritual of debate, conceptually geneticization offers
a limited account of the heterogeneity of socio-technical change.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since the early 1990’s, the concept of ‘geneticization’ has
become a watchword among critical commentators concerned
with the increasing application of genetic medicine. Like ‘ization’
words more generally, it belongs to a style of thinking within the
social sciences that refers to wide-ranging processes and conse-
quences. Such words have been the bread and butter of sociology
because they awaken the imagination and disrupt the naturalness
of social order. The more shocking the change, the more we take
notice. Geneticization has excellent shock value because it antici-
pates the potentially negative political consequences of genetic
reductionism and determinism.
Perhaps we can treat geneticization as a symptom of how the
social sciences think about biological science, and how this style of
thinking has changed. In the last couple of decades, social scientists
have questioned the extent to which reductionism and deter-
minism are actual properties of genetic knowledge, let alone
pervasive forces of social control. A consistent objection to this
thesis is the hyperbole of its theoretical claims. Concerns about the
very nature of socio-technical change have engendered twoLtd. This is an open access articlecomplementary responses: some re-articulate the transformational
agenda of the ‘new genetics’ through a more nuanced view of po-
wer, while others pursue an empirical agenda of carefully exposing
the contingency of geneticization. An important theme that runs
through these debates is the varieties of constructionism that seek
to analyse biomedical change in terms of its processes and
consequences.
This paper aims to reconstruct the geneticization thesis by
tracing it back to early political critiques of medicine. Both medi-
calization and geneticization belong to a family of radical political
thought which seeks to liberate the oppressed from biomedical
totalities and essences. I will argue that the constructionist style of
thinking that underpins these critiques obscures and exaggerates
the nature of socio-technical change. In the wake of geneticization,
a style of thinking has emerged within the social sciences that
embrace the contingency and multidimensionality of biological
science. To illustrate this, the paper offers an analytical review of
empirical studies that, in various ways, engage with the genetici-
zation thesis. Three domains are explored e disease classiﬁcation,
clinical practice and biosocialitye to assess the conceptual utility of
geneticization. There are several questions that guide the following
inquiry: is geneticization good to think with? Does it accurately
describe current developments in biomedicine? And what can we
learn from its conceptual history? It is the last of these questionsunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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2. The geneticization thesis
The concept of geneticization entered circulation through the
work of Lippman, a radical epidemiologist and dedicated activist
for women’s health. Over the course of three papers (1991, 1992,
1994), she developed a detailed account of geneticization as ‘an
ongoing process by which differences between individuals are
reduced to their DNA codes, with most disorders, behaviours and
physiological variations deﬁned, at least in part, as genetic in origin’
(1991: 19). The concept encompasses an extraordinary range of
processes and effects, a brief summary of which includes: expansion
of health and illness via genetic technologies; differentiation of in-
dividuals on the basis of genetic variation; construction of biological
phenomena through inappropriate labelling of health and disease
as ‘genetic’ rather than social, structural or environmental; political
economy of disease prediction and prevention; and socio-cultural
expectations that reinforce the use of genetic technologies, espe-
cially in the context of women’s reproductive choices.
Lippman’s account of human genetics reﬂects strong political
concerns towards science that begin to emerge in the late 1980s.
The new alliance between feminism and constructionism chal-
lenged modernist narratives of technological progress and scien-
tiﬁc objectivism (Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1988). A fertile ground
for feminist critique was the objection that science creates ‘es-
sences’ which effectively naturalize social categories. Geneticiza-
tion is the extension of feminist arguments about the oppressive
use of biology which feeds into a cluster of concerns about:
 Genetic reductionism e a scientiﬁc methodology that explains
biological traits in terms of speciﬁc gene functions
 Genetic determinism e gene function has powerful causal
properties that exclude environmental inﬂuences for traits such
as disease and behaviour
 Genetic essentialism e genes are immutable attributes that
impute the identity and function of human life
Many writing about the ‘new genetics’ have tapped into one or
more of these themes. Alpers and Beckwith (1993) express concern
that reinstating ideas that traits are ‘genetically determined’ may
justify discrimination and inequality. Nelkin and Lindee (1995: 2)
argue that the dominance of modern genetics in popular culture is
synonymous with ‘genetic essentialism’, which ‘reduces the self to
a molecular entity, equating human beings, in all their social, his-
torical, and moral complexity, with their genes’. Others emphasise
that genetic technologies transform human understanding because
the gene is a symbol of personhood, identity and social relation-
ships (Hoedemaekers& ten Have, 1998). In this vein, Katz Rothman
(1998) writes that genetics is an ‘ideology’ that explains everything:
‘Genetics is the single best explanation, the most comprehensive
theory since God. Whatever the question is, genetics is the answer’
(1998: 13). Van Dijck presents a less uniﬁed view of genetics in
popular culture. She argues that genetics is a cultural narrative of
‘images and imaginations’ (1998: 2) that passes through successive
stages of historical development.
It is worth noting that these themes are much broader than
Lippman’s original thesis. This is partly because many of these
writers are exploring the public life of genetics as cultural symbols,
narratives and prevailing ideas that redeﬁne personhood, identity
and sociality. Lippman’s account of genetics is a critique of the
medical establishment. Indeed, she refers to the ‘extensive litera-
ture on medicalization’ (1991: 27) as a precursor to many of her
concerns about prenatal testing. Hedgecoe (1998, 1999) and others
(ten Have, 2001; Shostak et al., 2008) have also noted the closerelationship between geneticization and medicalization. It is the
conceptual origins of the latter to which I now want to turn.
3. Medicalization
Medicalization shares more than a presumed resemblance to
geneticization e the medicalization literature is also an intellectual
foundation of sociology’s thinking toward biological science.
Medicalization has become a staple concept of sociology in adju-
dicating the relationship between science and society. Most com-
mentators seem to agree that it describes a process of development
and change in Western medicine often located within a broader
thesis of ‘modernization’ (Bell and Figert, 2012). The diverse origins
of the concept point to an ethos of ‘anti-medicine’ (Osborne, 1994),
a mode of thinking concerned with how medicine developed
without regard for the people it serves. The same kind of thinking is
preserved in the idea that new genetic technologies are essentially
repressive. I want to comment on the political context out of which
this style of thinking emerges.
Gerhardt (1989) traces the origins of medicalization to the po-
litical turmoil in Europe in the late 1960s, and the perceived failure
of Marxism after the 1968 student revolutions. One line of argu-
ment emerging in the 1970s focussed on the political economy of
health and the growing scepticism towards ‘power, proﬁt and
politics’ of the American healthcare system (Ehrenreich and
Ehrenreich, 1970). Another line of argument developed out of the
Chicago School broke ranks with Marxism and Parsonian structural
functionalism. It understood professional dominance as power to
deﬁne deviance, which formed part of a general cultural pattern of
‘blaming the victim’ (Ryan, 1971). Freidson (1970) was one of the
ﬁrst to draw on the social construction of professional knowledge.
He argued that medicine creates its own privileged universe of
knowledge which serves the interests of insiders while objectifying
those on whom the knowledge is practiced. Zola (1972, 1975)
extended Freidson’s ideas in two ways: ﬁrst, medicine is an ‘insti-
tution of social control’ designed to extend medical jurisdiction,
and second, the medicalization of deviance stigmatizes the
vulnerable and the powerless.
The idea that medicalization is caused by wider social processes
was popularized by Illich’s (1976) cultural critique of medicine.
What he called the ‘medicalization of life’ was a full-scale attack on
modern society being colonized by three levels of ‘iatrogenesis’:
illness was a by-product of medical treatment at the clinical, social
and structural level. A key aspect of Illich’s argument is that pro-
cesses of over-industrialization and bureaucratization of healthcare
alienate the person from his or her own body and render them
dependent upon medical professionals. However, others claim that
these processes are a consequence of political power (Navarro,
1986). Medicalization reproduces a class structure in capitalist so-
ciety by serving the interests of powerful groups (Waitzkin, 1983)
and by creating a system of healthcare around ‘commodity
fetishism’ (Navarro, 1975). In contrast, a social constructionist
framework shows that medicalization is a more heterogeneous
phenomenon of not only controlling deviance (Conrad, 1975), but
allowing various social movements and interest groups to advocate
a medical diagnosis for ‘new’ conditions (Conrad, 1992; Conrad and
Schneider, 1980).
Feminist writers have also taken up the medicalization thesis to
show how patriarchal institutions use deﬁnitions of illness and
disease tomaintain the inequality of women. They strongly criticize
the ways in which women’s bodies and experiences have been
disproportionately medicalized (Riessman, 1983). Resonating with
Lippman’s (1991) concerns about geneticization and pregnancy,
these studies tend to focus on the explicitly material relations
through which pregnancy and child birth are brought under
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experience of childbirth has become alienating because medical
interventions seem to deny women the ability to have healthy
babies naturally or they are coerced into accepting obstetric tech-
niques such as epidurals, analgesics, caesareans, inductions, etc.
Michel Foucault has been inﬂuential in drawing attention to
aspects of medical perception, surveillance and control. His work
has been used to emphasise the diverse social and political condi-
tions that governed the formation of medical discourse (Foucault,
1975, 1977). Critics of both medicine and genetics have tended to
use Foucault selectively to support a thesis of medical domination,
often linking the ‘clinical gaze’ with a notion of the ‘docile body’ of
the patient (e.g. Armstrong, 1984; Lippman, 1992). Medical
knowledge is depicted as part of an expanding ‘normalizing gaze’ of
surveillance that subjects individuals to increasing differentiation
and conformity. However, this reading of medical power-as-
domination is at odds with Foucault’s repeated emphasis on the
productive, distributed and relational nature of power (Foucault,
1984). In his later work, Foucault (1997) developed an account of
power as immanent in political and ethical practices of freedom.
Others have taken up this ‘ethico-political’ dimension of power to
analyse the reshaping of citizenship and subjectivity in contem-
porary biomedicine (Rose, 2007b).
The medicalization thesis offers an interesting case study of
contrasting perspectives of power and control. Marxist, construc-
tionist and Foucauldian perspectives tend to overplay the passivity
and dependency of the patient, casting the lay person in the role of
‘victim’ rather than beneﬁciary of the medical encounter. Various
claims about the ‘medicalization of life’, ‘victim blaming’ and the
‘reiﬁcation’ of categories overstate the hold that medicine has over
contemporary experience. Bury argues that these abstract proper-
ties of medical power ‘perpetuate an argument without the pos-
sibility of refutation’ (1986: 158e159). The exaggeration of medical
imperialism partly relates to sociology’s ‘self-serving’ ideology of
radical scepticism (Strong, 1979), but more importantly it relates to
a particular view of power as unilateral, pervasive and repressive.
To summarise, medicalization is not a single ‘thesis’ but a loose
amalgam of arguments and perspectives which ﬁnd their origin in a
kind of anti-medicine thinking. Not all proponents subscribe to this
anti-medicine view; some withhold a normative agenda and
restrict their analyses to describing processes of medical control,
while others seek to critique these processes by highlighting the
negative consequences of professional dominance. I propose that
there are three key features of this style of thinking.
 Medicine is a totality: The origins of this thinking are rooted in
organismic andmechanistic metaphors of the relations between
parts and wholes. It implies that medical power is an internally
generated phenomenon. The increasing jurisdiction of medical
imperialism ‘grows’ or ‘evolves’ through relations of interiority
and linear causality: non-medical categories become medical
categories, deviant behaviours are assigned medical meanings,
patients are observed and objectiﬁed.
 Medicine is an essence: Medical knowledge is often thought to
contain an underlying essence of a medical model in an episte-
mological sense or a control function in a political sense. Es-
sences overlap with totalities because they provide a blueprint
of the whole. They deny that medicine is a multiplicity of re-
lations oriented to different aspects of medical practice, e.g.
surgery, paediatrics, podiatry, oncology, epidemiology, general
practice, etc.
 Anti-medicine is emancipatory: Anti-medicine sometimes con-
tains a nostalgia for medicine that used be more caring and
individualizing, more social and ecological. This sentimentalism
for the past is historically connected to a utopian view of libertywhere the balance of power and freedom is locked in a zero-sum
game. The political goal of anti-medicine is to liberate the hu-
man body from medical authority.
In this section, I have argued that anti-medicine is an ethos
informed by a variety of theoretical frameworks and traditions.
Certainly, early critiques of medicine were more totalizing in their
conception of medical power, whereas more recent versions
emphasise the multidimensionality of contemporary biomedicine
(Clarke et al., 2003; Rose, 2007b). Whether or not these changes
reﬂect social epochs of ‘modernity’ or ‘postmodernity’ (Bell and
Figert, 2012) is less interesting than asking whether our present
conceptualizations are ﬁt for purpose.
4. Reassessing geneticization
Geneticization shares many conceptual characteristics with
medicalization. For instance, there is a similar tendency to refer to
genetics as a uniﬁed totality: a ‘cultural icon’ (Nelkin and Lindee,
1995), a ‘dominant discourse’ (Lippman, 1991) and a process of
‘genetic colonization’ (Lippman, 1992). It implies that genetic
knowledge contains an underlying essence of reductionism that
restricts conceptions of health and illness. Its emancipatory agenda
implies that essentialism is repressive, either excluding marginal
social groups or isolating individuals in their own pathology.
Furthermore, the moral consequences of genetic explanations
intensify individual responsibility and subtly coerce individuals to
privately manage their risk.
Debates about geneticization have examined whether its theo-
retical links with medicalization undermine its conceptual utility.
The issue is whether geneticization is too polemic and politically
loaded to serve as a useful framework for empirical research
(Hedgecoe, 1998). Those who support the concept have argued that
it should be understood as a wider cultural activity of discussing
‘meanings of genetics’ (Van Dijck, 1998: 29). Like the concept of
medicalization, it is a ‘heuristic tool’ for directing and focussing
moral debate (ten Have, 2001). However, others claim that
geneticization is more a rhetorical device for opposing ‘crude
reductionism’ (Kerr, 2004) and disputing the jurisdiction of ge-
netics over areas of health and illness (Weiner and Martin, 2008).
There is validity in the claim that geneticization mobilizes a
particularly rigid view of genetic reductionism. Overemphasising
the explanatory power of genes maintains a continuous relation-
ship between past eugenic abuses and present dangers. For
instance, Nelkin and Lindee (1995: 203) argue that ‘fantasies of
biological management encoded in genetic essentialism acquire a
sinister cast because they can so readily be made to come true
through new biomedical technologies at the infertility clinic or the
doctor’s ofﬁce’. Lippman believes that genetic prediction and pre-
vention will promote ‘an old-fashioned, conservative and poten-
tially coercive model of medicine’ (1992: 1473). These accounts are
rhetorically compelling because they overstate the continuity be-
tween past and present. They also cast new genetic technologies in
the role of amplifying reductionism and determinism.
There is not one kind of reductionism in biological medicine.
Reductionism is also a methodological paradigm that seeks to
explain biological systems in terms of their component parts. The
Human Genome project was genetic reductionism par excellence,
though its brute force approach to mapping the sequence of the
human genome did not result in more determinism. In fact, the
relatively modest discovery of 20,000 genes signalled the end of
genetic determinism (Fox Keller, 2000) and conﬁrmed that a
genome is not a parts list for human physiology. Reductionist
techniques have transformed our understanding of genes from
being discrete units of heredity with stable effects to fragmentary
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complex ways (Freese and Shostak, 2009). The complexity of the
genome is a stunning reminder that reductionism and determinism
occupy ﬂexible boundaries alongside processes of emergence and
indeterminism.
Arguably, geneticization contains an ambiguous thesis about the
‘social construction’ of reality. Hacking (1999) argues that social
constructionist arguments are difﬁcult to pin down because the
object being constructed may refer to several different entities (e.g.
persons, categories, technologies) while the ‘social’ aspect of con-
struction may involve interaction between different kinds of en-
tities. The obscurity of the geneticization concept seems to relate to
it being a kind of ‘complex’ in which processes and effects are fused
together. Lippman concedes that ‘most neologisms confuse rather
than clarify’ (1991: 19), but insists that geneticization provides a
new vocabulary to interpret human genetics. Supporters have
identiﬁed this multi-levelled reference as a useful resource for
public discussion (ten Have, 2001), while others ﬁnd that it lacks
grounding in empirical reality (Hedgecoe, 1998).
Hacking (1999: 49) argues that we need to adopt a more literal
sense of construction in terms of ‘building or assembling from
parts’ to give a clearer account of the complex relationship between
processes and products. Some have adopted the concept of ‘as-
semblages’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) to stress the combinations
of spaces, persons and techniques in which contemporary
biomedicine is said to be organized (Clarke et al., 2003). Various
entities such as genes, persons, technologies, organizations, net-
works, etc., are capable of acting as components within new as-
semblages at different levels of scale (Latour, 2005). While the
concept has been used in the social science of medicine to char-
acterize the multidimensionality of contemporary medicine, it is
usually mentioned only in passing.
Drawing on different elements of Deleuze’s work, DeLanda
(2006) offers a theory of assemblages that presents an alternative
version of construction. He sees the problem of social con-
structionism as being overly reliant on explaining the relationship
between categories and their referents in terms of ‘meaning’. While
linguistic meaning may well be a component of construction,
assemblage theory is concerned with how categories themselves
are assembled through heterogeneous parts within a larger matrix
of institutions and practices. For DeLanda (2006: 44), the object of
analysis is not the ‘linguisticality of experience’ in a phenomeno-
logical sense, but processes of assembly in a ‘real’ historical sense.
Thus medical or genetic explanations create socially embedded
dynamics between categories and kinds of individuals. Assemblage
theory is a method of ‘ontological clariﬁcation’ rather than a sub-
stitute for empirical social science research. By refusing to think in
totalities and essences, it offers a theoretical framework for un-
derstanding how networks of people, genes and technologies are
assembled in novel ways.
The remainder of the paper will explore three areas of the
empirical literature on geneticization: disease classiﬁcation, clinical
practice and biosociality. The following review is not an exhaustive
list but a selection of empirical and historical work inwhich authors
are explicitly reﬂecting on the geneticization concept. The task is to
read this body of work in terms of ‘assembly’ to reach some kind of
ontological clarity about the usefulness of geneticization.
5. Disease classiﬁcation
Geneticization presents a distinctly linguistic account of how
disease categories are constructed through ‘stories’ about genetic
testing and screening. Lippman’s thesis is not as radical as to deny ‘a
biological reality to disease’; her point is that the distribution of
health and disease is the product of ‘social and culturalassumptions’ as well as ‘vested interests and ideologies’ (1991: 17).
In this sense, geneticization is a ‘dominant discourse’ capable of
‘conditioning how we view, name and propose to manage a whole
host of disorders and disabilities’ (1991: 18). Given the extraordi-
nary range of the thesis, it is not surprising that Lippman views her
own perspective as ‘going beyond’ earlier sociological versions of
disease construction. It is worth brieﬂy considering the difference
between these versions of construction.
Lippman (1991) cites Yoxen’s discussion on the construction of
genetic disease as the basis for broadening her own claims about
the power of genetic explanations. Yoxen also argues that medical
and scientiﬁc knowledge of diseases is ‘socially determined’ and yet
‘grounded in a material reality’ (1982: 144), but his historical ac-
count of clinical genetics reveals an uneven distribution of genetic
explanations owing to the ‘structural constraints of the modern
healthcare system’ (1982: 148). Genetic knowledge plays a modest
role in constructing disease due to continuing professional nego-
tiation over the conceptual relevance of genetics to medicine. The
impact of genetic categories are constrained by the interplay of
economic and professional interests, the changing composition of
medical specialization and the relegation of genetic expertise to
research facilities within hospitals. Yoxen’s version of construction
is not concerned with the intrinsic power of genetic explanations,
but the conditions that allow these claims to be produced in the
ﬁrst place. Rather than a uniﬁedwhole, genetic knowledge emerges
haphazardly from competing specializations within medicine.
Others have adopted a similar style of constructionism to
eschew the claim that genetic disease is ‘whatever we say it is’. For
instance, Hedgecoe (1999) seeks to test the concept of geneticiza-
tion by exploring a neutral historical context where less revolu-
tionary processes are at work. Genetic aetiology is shown to have
variable effects, often allowing non-genetic factors to play a role, to
present a more cautious and responsible face of research. Hedgecoe
(2001) calls this the narrative of ‘enlightened geneticization’ where
scientists construct schizophrenia as a genetic disease while at the
same time tolerating phenotypic heterogeneity and multifactorial
causation. In a similar vein, Kerr (2000) explores the construction of
cystic ﬁbrosis and male infertility as an opportunity to contextu-
alize genetic reductionism. Reductionism is a highly ﬂexible and
dynamic process that reﬂects the instability of genes, symptoms
and test results. Like Hedgecoe, Kerr identiﬁes a similar strategy of
acknowledging ambiguity and complexity of genetic disease.
Rather than a source of difﬁculty, uncertainty is fundamental to
constructing a clinical continuum between cystic ﬁbrosis and male
infertility.
The geneticization of disease classiﬁcations systems seems to
involve more than basic science colonizing the clinical domain.
Classiﬁcation systems are negotiated compromises that have to
satisfy the practical requirements of different user communities
(Bowker and Star, 1999). Diagnostic classiﬁcations must have
therapeutic utility for clinicians and patients. The geneticization of
diabetes is an example of such a compromise where genetic ex-
planations took over 20 years to dominate the nomenclature due to
disagreement among clinicians (Hedgecoe, 2002). Even conditions
that were thought to be relatively simple to ‘geneticize’ have yiel-
ded tensions between clinicians and researchers over classiﬁcation.
The geneticization of cystic ﬁbrosis has led to classiﬁcatory
expansion but it has also produced ‘a degree of nosological uncer-
tainty’ (Hedgecoe, 2003: 63). While it may be true that some
conditions, like coronary heart disease (CHD), have become fully
geneticized, genetic explanations form part of a wider archipelago
of different and competing assemblies of CHD (Hall, 2005; Weiner
and Martin, 2008).
These and other conditions should serve as a warning that
geneticization is not a unifying framework that stratiﬁes disease
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nuity into medical classiﬁcation. For geneticization to work, we
would expect a relatively smooth classiﬁcatory expansion via lin-
guistic processes e what DeLanda (2006) calls the myth of ‘taxo-
nomic essentialism’. Assemblage theory offers a better explanation
for this unevenness by deﬁning the properties of an assemblage in
terms of relations of exteriority: the identity of an assemblage
(whether it being genetic research groups and their human subjects
or clinicians and their patients) is always the product of an open-
ended process; this process is always precarious since other pro-
cesses can destabilize it; and a process is never a system of pure
logic but involves causal interventions in realitywhich may produce
nonlinear (variable, unexpected) effects. Thus, the factors that
mitigate geneticization arise from the contingent nature of het-
erogeneous relations between assemblages at different levels of
scale.
6. Clinical practice
Geneticization raises the justiﬁable concern that clinical appli-
cation of genetic technologies actually ‘constructs’ needs and ob-
ligations e simply offering prenatal testing and screening to at risk
women implies an obligation to accept the offer (Lippman,1991). In
this sense, pregnant women are more genetically ‘made up’ than
men who have become ‘moral pioneers’ of new genetic technolo-
gies (Rapp, 1998). Rapp (1998) cautions that reproductive tech-
nologies are unevenly distributed, with many working class
women (especially from ethnic-racial minorities) refusing to be
tested. Dilemmas of themoral pioneer are played out on ‘an uneven
and shifting terrain’ stratiﬁed in terms of class, ethnicity and gender
(1998: 68). Nevertheless, some express concern that women at risk
of breast/ovarian cancer are obliged to adopt ‘iatrogenic’ practices
of risk management, which impose a burden of ‘genetic re-
sponsibility’ on women’s identity (Hallowell, 1999).
The relationship between genetics and responsibility has
featured strongly among empirical and theoretical accounts of
clinical genetics. Rather than dissolving the relations of the person,
genetic categories appear to reterritorialize (Deleuze and Guattari,
1987) the familial assemblage by extending boundaries and obli-
gations. For instance, Armstrong et al. (1998: 1658) have shown the
ways in which the genetic consultation does not isolate and mar-
ginalise but entangle individuals in ‘a web of genetic connected-
ness’. Geneticization is a process of ‘revealing’ a genetic identity in
which responsibility is dissipated in a newly assembled network of
biological relations. Novas and Rose (2000) also disagree that
geneticization will result in treating the individual as an isolate.
They argue that ‘the geneticization of identity has to be located in a
more complex ﬁeld of identity practices’ (2000: 491). In treating
identities as multiplicities, there is no good reason for why the
ascription of a ‘genetic’ identity should dissolve these or other
identities.
Ethnographies of the genetics clinic have shown that genetici-
zation oversubscribes the agency of practitioners. Paternalism may
have once been the dominant style of eugenic counselling but it no
longer deﬁnes the genetics clinic today. The clinical consultation is
itself a kind of ephemeral assemblage in which the client emerges
as an active and ‘pragmatic subject’ (DeLanda, 2006: 49). For
instance, predictive genetic testing for breast cancer has become a
‘clinical encounter’ inwhich the complex investment and actions of
patients and their families are salient features of how genetic risk is
framed (Gibbon, 2002). The consultation is a dynamic space of
‘intense bi-directional affective entanglements’ (Rose, 2001: 10)
where counsellors employ a variety of techniques for rendering
client’s actions, thoughts and feelings into a language that is
amenable to professional judgement. While counsellors mayindeed control the format of communication, client autonomy
emerges from the clinical assemblage as subjects capable of
assimilating diagnostic uncertainty (Timmermans and Buchbinder,
2010) and ambivalent risk information (Arribas-Ayllon and Sarangi,
2014).
Even the construction of a genetic diagnosis does not involve the
straightforward application of new technologies. Genetic technol-
ogies may confer nonlinear effects which need to be aligned with
the existing stability of clinical assemblages. Clinical work reﬂects a
merging of old and new styles of professional reasoning. Shaw et al.
(2003: 5) show that clinical decision-making is not supplanted by
new molecular technologies, but adjudicated through existing ‘hi-
erarchies and traditions of clinical practice’. Genetic tests may
extend the diagnostic repertoire of clinical decision-making, but
the value of testing is negotiated in relation to ‘traditional diag-
nostic techniques of history, observation and examination, inves-
tigation and diagnosis’ (2003: 16). For dominant conditions
characterized by variable expressivity, molecular testing is not even
prioritized as a diagnostic tool since other models of clinical
management and psychosocial support are seen to be more aligned
with patient experiences (Cox and Starzomski, 2004). Even when
used, genetic tests are not deﬁnitive instruments for ascribing a
disease category. In fact, genetic testing can complicate a diagnosis
by asserting a ‘genetic logic’ (Miller et al., 2005) that may disregard
the presence or absence of clinical symptoms, or produce unin-
tended consequences that require ongoing ‘bridging work’ on the
part of professionals (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). In other
words, the preference for stability in the clinical assemblage is
deﬁned by whether causal interventions in reality (the imple-
mentation of a genetic test) can be productively aligned with pro-
fessional expertise, patient experience, clinical symptoms and
disease categories.
Even now, where new conditions are constituted as non-linear
assemblages, it makes little sense to say that the clinic has
become a space of reductionism. New biomedical entities are
emerging where disease processes are being characterized by
genomic complexity and phenotypic diversity. Clinical practices of
description and interpretation are oriented to treatingmutations as
component parts entering into relations of exteriority with other
component parts via epigenesis, epistasis, polygenicity, etc. At-
tempts to stabilize these entities ‘produce temporary agreements
on the clinical meaning, relevance and robustness of mutations
with regard to possible interventions that must be considered
reasonable and acceptable’ (Rabeharisoa and Bourret, 2009: 709).
Objectivity in the clinic engenders multiple activities that construct
provisional markers and ‘proxies’ of imperfectly known patholog-
ical entities, in which case it is difﬁcult see how the clinic of
genomic mutations is essentializing.
7. Biosociality
If the social ontology of genetics emerges from relations of
exteriority then the same principle applies to processes beyond the
clinical assemblage.When Donna Haraway announced the ‘death of
the clinic’ she reasoned that ‘our dominations don’t work by
medicalization and normalization any more; they work by
networking, communications redesign, stress management’ (1990:
69). Even if her claim about the clinic was overstated, the idea that
contemporary biomedicine extends beyond anatomy and depth is
well-taken. Practices of calculating risk or revealing mutations also
generates new social assemblages that operate beyond the clinic.
Rabinow (1996) coined the term ‘biosociality’ to describe the pro-
ductivity of genetic markers that constitute new categories and
groups of people. In part, it describes the ways in which identiﬁ-
cation of a biomarker combines old and new identity categories in
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logical politics of categories and networks holds more traction than
Lippman’s concerns about depth and stigma.
The new identities taking shape around genetic knowledge are
themselves the product of social assemblages comprising networks
of association between new kinds of entities, categories and groups.
New forms of patient organization are emerging, some of which
take their name from a single genomic variant: ‘Such groups will
have medical specialists, laboratories, narratives, traditions, and a
heavy panoply of pastoral keepers to help them experience, share,
intervene, and “understand” their fate’ (Rabinow, 1996: 102). In
quite the opposite direction of geneticization, many patients will
accept or seek to overcome their ‘fate’ by taking part in advocacy
organizations to inﬂuence genetic research (Stockdale and Terry,
2002), by forming novel collaborations between professional sci-
entists and patients to co-produce scientiﬁc knowledge (Callon and
Rabeherisoa, 2003), and by engaging in innovative forms of citi-
zenship to lobby resources for rare genetic diseases (Heath et al.,
2004). Genetic research has also intensiﬁed a ‘political economy
of hope’ (Novas, 2006) where patients form direct relations with
biomedical research to play their part in the production of biolog-
ical capital (Sunder Rajan 2006). Indeed, the capitalization of health
and wellbeing has become a more decisive driver in the search for
genetic differences than those based on race and ethnicity
(Hacking, 2006; Rabinow and Rose, 2006).
Disease genetics tends to prioritize the classiﬁcation of risks
rather than causes because many common complex conditions
elude aetiological explanations. However, there are unusual cases
that demonstrate how powerful networks of patients and pro-
fessionals are assembled around genomic classiﬁcation. Conditions
such as 22q13.3 and 22q11.2 are examples of ‘genomic designation’
(Navon, 2011) where the certainty of genetic markers gain ascen-
dency over the clinical uncertainty of phenotypes. Navon argues
that genomic designation is a new kind of classiﬁcation that does
not essentialize persons but, to borrow a phrase from Hacking
(1995), makes up ‘human kinds’. That is to say, where conditions
lack clinical coherence, genomic explanations have the power of
producing new kinds of people. Even when the science is partial
and where conditions are poorly understood, the ability to create
identities around genomic mutations is enough to create new
communities of shared recognition (Hacking, 2006).
The growth of the Internet is another development that attests
to the validity of biosociality. Collective practices of genetic iden-
tiﬁcation have created virtual communities dedicated to rare ge-
netic conditions (Novas and Rose, 2000) and speciﬁc genomic
mutations (Navon, 2011). In the current market of Direct-To-
Consumer Genetic Testing (DTCGT) for common mutations, the
twin concerns that commercialization and geneticization will
mislead consumers have not come to pass. Instead, we see new
forms of participation and ‘prosumption’ (Tofﬂer,1980) blurring the
boundaries between consumer, producer and expertise (Prainsack,
2014). Though not all people seek gene-based identities or partic-
ipate in online communities, biosociality seems to offer a better
description of the new opportunities for consumers to co-produce
genetic knowledge in ways that appear to be changing the rela-
tionship between experts and patients. Traditionally, genetics
professionals have developed their own ethical codes to mitigate
the ‘risks of knowing risk’. And yet the rise of ‘informational bio-
citizenship’ (Rose and Novas, 2005) may explain how communities
are taking responsibility for locating and discussing technical
knowledge prior to attending a genetic consultation. Online groups
seem to acquire scientiﬁc literacy and negotiate expertise in ways
that dislodge genetics professionals as gatekeepers of specialized
knowledge (Schaffer et al., 2008).
In what seems to be a continuation of biopolitics, geneticknowledge is to be found among numerous kinds of citizenship
projects ‘from below’ that redistribute the norms of health around
an ethic of ‘care of the self’ (Foucault, 1997). For this reason, bio-
sociality will continue to provide an important framework for
thinking about the changing relations between state and commu-
nity and between experts and lay citizens. Assemblage thinking
reveals an afﬁrmative biopolitics that emphasises the productivity
of relations between genetic knowledge and subjectivity, though
not at the expense of understanding a biopolitics of control (Rose,
2007b).
8. Conclusion
The concept of geneticization is the product of speciﬁc political
and intellectual debates that have shaped our understanding of
genetic knowledge. Perhaps there is value in adopting a kind of
‘anthropology of reason’ (Rabinow, 1996) to understand the pecu-
liarity of historical events that have shaped this style of thinking in
the West. The medicalization critique certainly provided an intel-
lectual platform from which to launch concerns about the repres-
sive effects of human genetics. Like medicalization, geneticization
belongs to a style of social scientiﬁc thinking concerned with the
constitutive power of biomedicine. A distinctly linguistic version of
social constructionism exaggerates the essentializing effects of
genetic knowledge because it conceives biomedicine as a uniﬁed
totality of relations; it underestimates the multiplicity and auton-
omy of individuals, as well as the contingency of genetics and ge-
netic knowledge-production. The issue is whether recent events
have rendered this thinking obsolete.
A reconstruction of geneticization serves two purposes. It shows
that the style of thinking among social scientists about the conse-
quences of genetic knowledge can be traced back to intellectual
concerns about the jurisdiction of biological science. However, by
the 1990s, this style of thinking has already run its course e the
analysis of biomedicine as a totalizing and essentializing phe-
nomenon is no longer useful or intellectually fashionable. The new
style of thinking that begins to appear is one that adopts an
increasingly multidimensional perspective to grasp the diffuse and
distributed nature of biomedicine and the complex ﬁeld of identity
politics in which these practices occur. Contemporary biopolitics is
less concerned with the constitutive power of biological control
than exploring the government of freedom through contingency
(Dillon, 2007; Rose, 2007b). If genetic risk is a new dimension
through which we seek to manage our fateful responsibilities, then
it is no longer framed in terms of geneticization. In the era of DNA
microarrays, whole genome and exome sequencing, the commer-
cialization and continuous management of uncertainty has become
a distinct object of contemporary liberal governance.
In this review, I have drawn out elements of the empirical
literature on geneticization that reveal the variability and hetero-
geneity of genetic concepts, practices and technologies. Assem-
blage thinking is not an explicit property of this literature but
indicative of its style of thinking. Rather than an ideology with
unlimited explanatory power, genetic categories have a social
ontology. They are social entities assembled within networks of
competing specializations, arising haphazardly from the interplay
of economic and professional constraints. They are not deployed
ready-made into this or that domain, but undergo a degree of
negotiation and provisional alignment to satisfy the practical re-
quirements of different user communities. The same logic of as-
sembly can be applied to genetic reductionism. As a research
strategy, reductionism is not a rigid process of deriving the ‘essence’
of a genetic condition but of aligning symptoms, mutations and
explanations within ﬂexible and dynamic networks of practice. The
empirical and transformational agenda of these studies are
M. Arribas-Ayllon / Social Science & Medicine 159 (2016) 132e139138complementary in the sense that they expose the variability and
contingency of reductionism as contextual rather than ideological
processes.
The dynamic character of genetic knowledge is also a feature of
the clinical domain. Perhaps one of the major limitations of
geneticization is its relatively static portrayal of the clinical
consultation. The genetics clinic resembles much less a model of
unilinear communication than an ‘encounter’ between active
parties who produce a dense network of action, knowledge and
concern. On the one hand, new identities are revealed and
assembled within a matrix of biological relatedness, on the other
hand it generates affective entanglements of guilt, hope and obli-
gation. The idea that genetic technologies would ‘colonize’ the
diagnostic work of the clinic is also unwarranted. A more likely
scenario is a merging of old and new styles of professional
reasoning in which the value of testing is negotiated by traditional
diagnostic techniques. For many non-Mendelian conditions, at-
tempts to identify mutations are merely provisional markers
alongside diverse activities to render conditions clinically
meaningful.
The assumption that genetic information generates fatalism or
isolation is no longer a focus of recent sociological studies.
Emphasis has turned to the productivity of genetic information and
the ways in which relational forms of power seek to mutually
transform subjectivities to accept uncertainties and to manage risk
wisely. Rabinow (1996: 99) predicted a ‘new type of autopro-
duction’ in which identiﬁcation with biomarkers or risk categories
would assemble new forms of biosocial community. Actual or vir-
tual groups dedicated to understanding genetic information and
new kinds of classiﬁcatory regimes are quite literally assemblages
of categories, experts and lay citizens who seek to take charge of
their fate. Assemblage thinking is useful because it recognises the
immanence of power relations, the self-organising processes of
networks that form new, often afﬁrmative relations between per-
sons, mutations, categories, explanations, probabilities of risk, etc.
Is geneticization good to think with? The fact that its intellec-
tual, political and scientiﬁc foundations have dissolved is good
grounds for abandoning this style of thinking. In the tradition of
using ugly neologisms to characterize social change then perhaps
‘genomiﬁcation’ is a more accurate account of the contingency that
geneticization never adequately accounted for. Nevertheless,
geneticization continues to wield a rhetorical hold on the social
science literature, creating a useful ritual of discussion even when
terminologies have outlived their conceptual utility. If there is an
‘after’ geneticization, as I propose in the title of this paper, I mean
this only in the sense that it ‘might be the starting point of an
analysis, a sign of the need for an analysis, but it should not be the
conclusion of an analysis’ (Rose, 2007a: 702). A postscript on
geneticization is merely to clarify that a new style of thinking has
taken shape in the social sciences, one that conceptualizes socio-
technical change in terms of its cultural and ontological
heterogeneity.
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